Statement*

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Do New Threats Require New Approaches?

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*The views expressed in this statement are the personal views of the author, for which he alone bears responsibility.

The issue of European (and transatlantic) security has been engaged in earnest. Two years ago, shortly after his inauguration, Russian President Medvedev called for rethinking European security architecture in a major speech in Berlin. A year later, in part in response to Russian appeals, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) launched the Corfu process on European security challenges at an informal meeting of foreign ministers. At the same time, NATO initiated a review process that should lead to the adoption of a new strategic concept, to replace the current one from 1999, and a NATO-commissioned Group of Experts has conducted four seminars on the new concept, the last in Washington, DC, on February 22-23, 2010.

The reasons Russia, on the one hand, and Europe and the United States, on the other, began this review of European security were related, but ultimately reflected different concerns.

For Russia, the reason was a profound, long-standing, and growing dissatisfaction with developments in Europe since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It saw NATO expansion and military action against Yugoslavia, colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, a mounting U.S. security presence in Central Asia, and the U.S. decision (since rescinded) to locate missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, among other things, as part of a concerted Western effort to weaken and contain Russia. Russia had little choice but to acquiesce in the immediate post-Soviet years, because it was indeed weak. But as it recovered earlier in this decade, it became more vocal in expressing its displeasure and more assertive in defending its interests. The war against Georgia in August 2008 was meant to send the message that Russia had the will and ability to defend its interests, by force if necessary. It underscored the urgency of reviewing the state of European security.

In Europe and the United States, Russia's call for a review was initially met with great skepticism and suspicion as little more than a thinly-veiled attempt to erode transatlantic comity and undermine NATO. The Russo-Georgian war, however, ended the easy assumption that had prevailed from the end of the Cold War that the West could pursue its goals in Europe, notably NATO expansion, in opposition to Russia, and manage Russia's displeasure with symbolic gestures of respect. As relations between Russia and the United States deteriorated sharply in late 2008, many Europeans concluded that Europe at least had to take up Russia's call to rethink European security. But there was another, equally cogent, reason for a review. The participation of NATO countries in Iraq and NATO's role in Afghanistan raised essential questions about the scope of NATO's activities, while terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) highlighted the growing external threat to European security. A new global environment was emerging that the strategic concept of 1999 had not fully anticipated.

This new environment underscores a key point: Not only is the Cold War over, so is the post-Cold War world we had envisioned a generation ago. American hopes that the demise of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union had ushered in a prolonged era of global advance of democracy and free markets under American leadership have proved illusory. Rather, the advance has now halted, if not gone into reverse, and the

world has entered a period of great flux and uncertainty that will endure until a new global equilibrium emerges. Current trends and developments are producing profound consequences for European security, which we need to think through carefully. Three in particular stand out.

The Changing Role of Europe

First, and most important in strategic terms, Europe, in sharp contrast to the past 400-500 years, no longer lies at the center of the international system, and the struggle for advantage in, and at the extreme mastery of, Europe is no longer the central drama of world affairs. Europe, of course, remains important as one of the leading centers of economic prowess and will remain so well into the future. But clearly global dynamism is ineluctably shifting from Europe and the Atlantic region to East and South Asia and the Pacific region. The shift is most conspicuous in economic matters – with the rise of China and, to a lesser extent, India - but the shift is also occurring in the realm of geopolitics and eventually will affect all other dimensions of international relations. The ongoing economic crisis has only highlighted – and likely accelerated – this long-term trend.

The changing status of Europe should produce a corresponding change in the way the United States understands its interests in Europe. Since this country emerged as a global power a little over a century ago, its interests in Europe could be summed up in three simple imperatives: (1) prevent any one power from dominating Europe and by extension the global order, (2) minimize the risk of great-power confrontation in Europe that would destabilize the global system and destroy a vast amount of wealth; and (3) develop close commercial relations for the benefit of America's long-term prosperity. In pursuit of these goals in the 20th century, the United States fought two hot wars and engaged in a lengthy cold war. In the Second World War and Cold War, the challenge was heightened by the fact that the potential masters of Europe (Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union) were aggressive regimes existentially hostile to American values and interests.

In today's environment, however, the United States needs a united Europe that can act as a genuine global partner in meeting multiple challenges and managing an increasingly complex global system. As a consequence of the success of the United States and its European allies over the past 65 years in building and expanding NATO and encouraging Europe's economic integration, a united Europe will not so much be dominated by a single power as governed by a combination of supranational federal and national authorities. Moreover, it will be a Europe that shares America's values and interests, its worldview, in broad terms. Finally, a united Europe will minimize the risk of geopolitically consequential instability in Europe, something that will allow the United States to devote greater attention and resources to the emerging challenges beyond Europe, particularly in the broader Middle East and East Asia.

For this reason, the United States needs to overcome its ambivalence about European unity. Although rhetorically the United States has consistently supported European

integration, and at times played a major role in promoting it beginning with the Marshall Plan, it has been uneasy about the consequences of broader and deeper integration for its ability to advance its interests in Europe and with Europe. Since the founding of NATO, for example, Washington has played on differences among European states to manage the Alliance in ways that advanced U.S. interests, most recently, by pitting "new" Europe against "old" Europe. Similarly, Washington has been leery of a growing security role for the European Union, out of fear that it would diminish NATO's role as the premier Euro-Atlantic security institution and therefore erode American influence in Europe.

Today, the United States should be pressing for greater European unity on foreign and security policy, and encourage greater influence for the EU President and "foreign minister" under the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the United States must continue to push for a greater European responsibility in dealing with the security issues inside Europe, such as the continuing conflict and instability in the Balkans. As the EU expands, many of these issues should become "domestic" European issues.

The movement toward greater unity on foreign and security policy will, of course, take considerable time. As this process moves forward, the United States will need to maintain a major presence in Europe, especially through NATO, to guard against any temptation to renationalize security policy. But the United States should seek in word and deed to foster greater European integration and unity.

The Russian Question

Just as Europe's status is changing, so is Russia's, but in a more limited, non-strategic, yet still significant way. Russia has recovered from the deep socio-economic crisis and national humiliation of the 1990's and begun to reassert itself as a major power, even if it still faces formidable challenges – obsolete infrastructure, demographic decline, endemic corruption - to sustained economic growth and consolidation of its great-power status over the next decade and beyond. With recovery has come a new foreign-policy orientation. Whereas in the immediate post-Cold War years, Moscow's goal was integration with the West, under Putin as president, it abandoned that goal in favor of re-establishing itself as an independent center of global power. Putin made that point clear in his remarks to the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, where he castigated alleged U.S. efforts to build a uni-polar world; detailed Russian grievances against the United States, NATO, and the OSCE; and vowed that Russia would pursue an independent foreign policy, as it had done throughout its history.

Consistent with this new foreign policy, Russia has sought to halt – if not reverse – developments it considers inimical to its interests. This has been clearest in its vehement opposition to the further expansion of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU. This goal also lies behind Russia's moratorium on participation in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which it considers an infringement on its sovereign right to base its military forces as it sees fit on its own territory, and its effort to discredit and undermine those OSCE elements charged with democracy promotion, which it believes have been directly aimed at domestic political practices – and the legitimacy of the

regimes - in Russia and other former Soviet states. While many, particularly in eastern Europe, see such policies as an attempt to revise the Cold War settlement, Russia considers them an effort to regain the place it had in Europe before the West took advantage of Russia's temporary strategic weakness in the 1990's.

Nevertheless, Russia does not pose a strategic threat to Europe and the United States, nor is it a strategic rival, as the Soviet Union once was. Gone is the Cold-War ideological confrontation; remaining are the internal difficulties that preclude a global challenge to U.S. and European interests. But Russia does raise two critical issues for European security because its identity as a great power is caught up in the role it has historically played in Europe.

- How to deal with the states between Russia and the European Union (and NATO), the former Soviet space from Moscow's perspective, the new neighbors, from Brussels'. Russia sees primacy in this region as crucial to its great-power aspirations. Geopolitically, this region has given Russia its heft in world affairs. In the eyes of the Russian elite, the region remains critical to Russia's own security and prosperity. Moroever, the ability to project power into neighboring states is in and of itself evidence of Russia's great-power status. For these reasons, Russia has declared that it has "privileged interests" – to use President Medvedev's formulation – in the former Soviet space and looks askance at any encroachment by an outside power, be it the United States or the EU. Europe, backed by the United States, will, however, never accept a Russian zone of "privileged interests," both because they have legitimate interests in their new neighbors and because of their fundamental belief that the states of the region have a sovereign right to pursue their own interests as they see fit.

- How to define Russia's interests in Europe. Historically, Russia has played a major role in Europe, but much of what happens in Europe today is increasingly "domestic" politics, in which Russian involvement should justifiably be minimal. The issue becomes more acute with regard to those states slated for future EU membership, essentially the Balkans, an area in which Russia has had significant interests and continues to insist on its right to play a central role. Related to this concern are Russian efforts to retard the process of European integration to bolster its own standing. The reasoning is straightforward: Russia can compete as an equal with Europe's major powers – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; it cannot compete effectively against a united Europe, whose power potential would outweigh Russia's by an order of magnitude, as the United States' does today. Not surprisingly, Russia prefers to deal with European states bilaterally, as opposed to the European Union, and seeks to play them off against one another to advance its own interests, witness the way it has managed its energy policy toward Europe in recent years.

Resolving these conflicts in Europe is difficult, if not impossible, with a narrow and traditional focus on European security concerns. That approach encourages Cold-War paradigms and zero-sum thinking not only in Russia, but also in Europe and the United

States. A more promising approach would be to enlarge to context to include the global challenges to European security. That leads to the third point.

Emerging Challenges

Global developments and trends now call for a broader view of the challenges and threats confronting the United States, Europe, and Russia, or European security in its broadest terms. Instability in the Balkans and the Caucasus and Russia's aspirations indicate that the traditional focus of European security, stability on the continent and avoidance of great-power conflicts, has not vanished. But the threat is probably at its lowest ebb in modern history. The greater dangers now arise from the challenges and threats that emanate from beyond Europe, as a result of the changing strategic environment and the evolution of globalization.

Three strategic developments bear close consideration:

- China. Its rise as a global power is a defining trend of the current period, although the process may not prove as linear, rapid, or dramatic as many now anticipate. China's large and growing role in the global economy is undisputed. Its influence on geopolitical matters is increasing, as it gains self-confidence, plays a more active, visible role in advancing its national interests, and broadens its search for natural resources to fuel its economy. To a lesser extent, India poses a similar challenge. These developments will further reduce Europe's influence if it does not act in a more unified fashion.

- The broader Middle East. This region is in the midst of an historic struggle between the forces of tradition and modernity that is spawning radical movements with global ambitions, destabilizing major countries, and jeopardizing the safety and security of vital energy flows, particularly out of the Persian Gulf, to global markets. Iran's emergence as the dominant regional power (and a likely nuclear one) will radically alter the region's geopolitics and undermine the non-proliferation regime. Generational shifts in leadership in Central Asia during this decade or the next will further stress already fragile societies. All these developments exacerbate the problems of non-proliferation, international terrorism, energy security, and narco-trafficking for Europe.

- The Arctic. This region contains a vast bounty of natural resources, including roughly 30 percent of global undiscovered gas and over 10 percent of global undiscovered oil, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. As global warming melts the icecap, competition for these resources is heating up among the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark. How these resources are developed will have significant consequences for Europe's energy security. At the same time, the possible opening up of a northern maritime route could have significant positive consequences for trade in the northern hemisphere, while also raising the risks of conflict over maritime rights.

As for the consequences of globalization, the spread of modern communications technology and the rapid diffusion of information and knowledge have complicated the challenge of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, empowered international terrorists, and created a new vulnerability, given the ever greater reliance of advanced societies on computers and the integrated Internet for basic functions and services. While we have great experience in dealing with proliferation and terrorism, cybersecurity presents a new challenge which we are only in the early phases of addressing. Cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 underscored the complexity of this issue – in particular the difficulty of identifying the attacker with certainty – and the urgency of developing defenses within the NATO context.

Finally, there are a host of non-traditional security challenges that will grow in prominence in a globalized and, it is hoped, increasingly prosperous world: climate change and energy security; migration; piracy, narco-trafficking, and transnational organized crime; resource scarcity. And as the ongoing global economic crisis has demonstrated, the ease of cross-border financial flows has overwhelmed regulatory systems that are national in orientation and reach.

What is important to note about these emerging challenges and threats is that they are to a great degree common to the United States, Europe, and Russia. Shared challenges and threats do not necessarily mean shared interests – Russia's tactical cooperation with China against U.S. and European initiatives and its sheltering of Iran are cases in point. But they could provide a foundation for cooperation on matters beyond Europe that would facilitate the resolution of continuing problems in Europe.

Institutional Framework

Do these global trends and developments call for a new European security architecture, as Russia insists? Probably not. A dense institutional network has emerged over the past 65 years in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region, which lies at the foundation of the region's security and stability. For the most part, these institutions can be used to address the emerging challenges, and they are already doing so in many ways. But the architecture needs to evolve, new ways of doing business are required, and greater resources need to be committed. Of great importance is the need to do a much better job in engaging Russia.

The core issue is the relationship among the United States, the European Union, and Russia, or what should be the three pillars of Europe writ large. Can we develop a mechanism that is consistent with American interests, encourages a more unified European foreign and security policy, and persuades Russia to act as a constructive partner on "beyond-Europe" issues and work in good faith in resolving the outstanding "inside-Europe" issues? A modest first step would be institutionalizing a structure of triangular discussions with U.S.-EU, EU-Russia, and U.S.-Russian legs. Some elements are already in place, namely, regular U.S.-EU and semi-annual EU-Russia summits. The missing element is regular U.S.-Russia summits, which over the past decade have been ad hoc. Moscow and Washington should now commit themselves to at least annual

summits. Consideration should also be given to an annual U.S.-EU-Russia trilateral event, not necessarily a summit, but at least at the ministerial level. All these meetings would help inform the work of institutions in which all three are involved, such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council. (In connection with these meetings, the United States, EU, and Russia should undertake a commitment to be transparent with countries not involved – e.g., Canada, Georgia, Norway, Turkey, Ukraine – about the contents, particularly with regard to issues that affect those countries' interests.)

Even with regular summits, the most sensitive issue will remain NATO, which Russia continues to see as a first-order danger to its interests and ambitions. Can the United States and Europe find a way to assuage Russian concerns without jeopardizing their own interests? That will require balancing a number of interests, in addition to Russia's and their own, including those of Poland and the Baltic states, which still see Russia as a major threat, and those of the states in between NATO and Russia, which do not savor being fields of geopolitical competition. What might the outlines of a solution look like? A few thoughts follow:

- NATO's primay function must remain collective security, with a focus on enhancing security and stability in Europe. That entails reassuring all Alliance members, particularly Poland and the Baltic states, that NATO will honor its Article V obligations on collective defense against an armed attack. NATO should continue to move ahead on developing contingency plans for the defense of Poland and the Baltic states and conducting appropriate exercises. At the same time, NATO should encourage those states to pursue pragmatic policies toward Russia and to take care to avoid gratuitous affronts to Russian sensitivities.

- The United States should encourage the emergence of a unified European pole within NATO and closer NATO-EU security cooperation. That would turn NATO into more of an equal U.S.-European partnership, encouraging Europe to enhance its own security capabilities and to take on a greater share of the responsibility for ensuring stability and security inside Europe, as the United States focuses more on global hard-security challenges.

- A unified Europe pole inside NATO would fundamentally change the way the Alliance functioned. It would also ease the task of working with Russia in an enhanced NATO-Russia Council. That Council, created in 2002, has not lived up to its potential, in part because of American concerns that Russia would seek to use it to split the Alliance. But as the process of European unification proceeds that danger is reduced, and the Council eventually becomes in effect a U.S.-EU-Russian forum. It will be a long time before that outcome is reached. In the meantime, the Council should focus on developing cooperation on dealing with threats that emanate from beyond Europe. That would entail building on current cooperative programs and initiating some new ones on, for example, missile defense against threats from the Middle East; counternarcotics, particularly in and around Afghanistan; piracy, building on current cooperation of the coast of Somali; counterterrorism, including joint analysis, training, and operations; and the Arctic, including discussion of joint

security measures.

- NATO should drop its resistance to cooperation with the Russian-led and dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). The Russians have requested such cooperation for several years, and the CSTO could provide assistance in dealing with the current challenge in Afghanistan, including terrorism and narco-trafficking.

- NATO should not offer Russia membership. Although that might have a certain appeal – in recent weeks three former senior German officials have adovated it – it is not likely to have the desired consequences. For any invitation would inevitably raise the question of the criteria under which Russia could become a member. Rather than focus on concrete cooperation, the sides would debate the criteria, a debate that will be divisive because of fundamental differences over the nature of the Alliance, civil-military relations, and democratic values.

- To deal with the concerns of the states in between NATO and Russia, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, the United States, Europe, and Russia might consider formally recommitting themselves to the principles of non-use of force and respect for state sovereignty, along the lines of the Helsinki Final Act. NATO membership for those states should be off the table for at least the time being, while the United States and Europe seek to engage Russia. In addition, consideration should be given to reviving the transparency and monitoring provisions of the CFE Treaty, while possibly eliminating those on troop levels within the core area and on the flanks, against which Russia has protested. Transparency and effective monitoring should provide sufficient warning time of any real threat of the use of force.

Over the long term, growing cooperation among the United States, Europe, and Russia could eventually transform NATO into a pan-European security organization. Indeed, that should be our strategic goal, even if it is a distant one at the moment.

One final note on process. Although there is no easy path to bringing Russia into European security arrangements as a constructive partner, there will be no progress if Russia is not brought into the review of these arrangements from the outset. The days when the United States and Europe could agree on what needed to be done and then present it to the Russians as a fait accompli with confidence that the Russians would adquiesce have long since past. If we want Russia to be with us in the end, we must invite them in at the beginning. In this regard, the trip of the NATO Expert Group to Moscow to discuss NATO's new strategic concept was an important symbol of the desire for cooperation and the determination to take Russia's interests into account.

To be sure, this involves risks, but they should be manageable. There is after all much greater overlap in American and European views, than in American and Russian or European and Russian views. Moreover, the United States and Europe have well-developed habits of, and tested mechanisms for, cooperation, which are lacking for both with respect to Russia. And there are limits to how far either the United States or Europe

can go in taking into account Russian interests before that endangers their own – differences over the former Soviet space are the obvious example of these limits. But we need to reach out now to see how constructive a partner Russia is prepared to be: We will be better able to meet emerging challenges if we are working with Russia and not at cross purposes. Nevertheless, if in the end Russia decides to stand apart despite our best efforts, the United States and Europe will still be able to work together to meet the emerging challenges, as we have met the challenges for the past 65 years.